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COMMON RIGHT, DUE PROCESS AND ANTITRUST
WALTON HAMILTON*
The Sherman Act' is the great charter of American industry.2 It is the elementary
ordinance about which the pattern of the public control of business has been woven.
It expresses the general rule, against which other statutes are elaboration, quhlifica-
tion, exception, accommodation to circumstance.
Over the centuries this fabric of control has been woven. Public policy, the com-
mon law, usages of trade, statutes of the realm, opinion popular and unpopular,
decrees of judges have all left their impress upon it. As industry has evolved, as
necessities have become evident, as ways of thought have changed, the process has
continued. The larger adjustment has been made by the legislature; the detail has
been worked out by the courts. The law of industry is the cumulative result of count-
less expediencies shaped to countless occasions, a corpus distilled from myriads of
decisions about everyday matters. Along a score of fronts its heritage of abstraction
meets concrete situations and in the impact each is remade by the other. Its trim
and tangled actuality is a product rather of the years than of intent. As a design it
reveals a sprawling trimness, an order at peace with confusion, a surge towards
diverse objectives. It has a beauty, a relevancy, an intricacy, an arresting quality
which no blue print come to life could ever possess. Its logic is the logic of things
that grow.
If one must be technical, the Sherman Act dates from 189o. The year marks the
occasion upon which the ancient law received formal expression in a federal statute.
Its translation from common law to Act of Congress was long overdue. As the
national economy was transformed by the coming of the machine, the balance sheet,
and the corporation, the pinch of transition was widely felt. A restriction of oppor-
tunity, a blocking of the channels of trade, an interference with the right of the
individual to his calling became matters of common complaint. Farmers were per-
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suaded that they were selling corn, hogs, wheat, cattle, tobacco, cotton to buyers
who were acting in concert. Consumers were convinced that in the purchase of
sugar, nails, copper, jute, cordage, borax, slate pencils, oil cloth, gutta percha, barbed
wire fence they encountered "the thumbscrew of monopoly." The little feller knew
for a certainty that he was being crowded to the wall by "the squeeze play," against
which there was, or ought to be, a law.3 The Robber Barons, seizing the chance
which mechanical invention had brought, were putting together their industrial
domains. Such matters clearly lay beyond the competence of the several states; the
Congress was continuously appealed to for a redress of grievances. All through the
eighties the issue provoked increasing debate. By the Fifty-first Congress it was no
longer to be denied.
In the Senate an act slowly took shape. A number of bills-unlike in objective,
substance, procedure, range, remedy-indicated the insistent demand for legislation.
After long deliberation the Finance Committee reported favorably in amended form
a bill introduced by Senator John Sherman.4 It declared "all arrangements, contracts,
trusts, or combinations made with the intention "to prevent full and free competition"
or "to advance the cost to the consumer" to be "against public policy, unlawful and
void." It provided that any person "injured or damnified" by such an act might sue
for and recover "twice the amount of the damages sustained and the cost of the suit."
An addenduni to the original measure conferred upon the circuit courts of the
United States "original jurisdiction of all suits of a civil nature or at equity" which
might result. It likewise directed the Attorney General and the several district attor-
neys "to prosecute all such cases to final judgment and execution." 5
For the real crusaders in the Senate this was far too mild a measure. Senator
Reagan, of Texas, had gone trust-busting over the wide open spaces, and he thought
he knew a criminal when he saw onre. So, first as a substitute, later as an amendment,
he offered his own bill. In rather severe terms it defined a "trust" as "a combination
of capital, skill or acts" by which two or more persons "create or carry out any restric-
tions in trade"; made all persons who were parties to such a trust "guilty of a high
misdemeanor"; and specified that each day tainted with a violation should be treated
as a "separate offense."' In like manner Senator Ingalls, conscious of the ills of the
Great Middle West, proposed a substitute which he likewise converted into an
amendment. In an elaboration of definition, penalty and detail it sought "the pre-
venting and suppressing, so far as may be," of deals in futures in agricultural prod-
ucts. Although as substitutes they were unacceptable, as amendments they were
welcome; and with a will the upper house added them to the measure before it. It
quickly became apparent that two such tails were far too much for the original kite.
Thereupon this omnibus act was recommitted-not to the Finance Committee
whence the pristine measure had come-but to the Judiciary Committee.
Within six days the Judiciary Committee returned to the Senate the bill--or
a2I CoNG. REc., passim (1889). a21 CONG. REc. 96 (1889).
S. x, Calendar No. 14, 51st Cong., ist Sess. (1889).
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rather a different bill. It had struck out all the lines that followed "be it enacted"
and in their stead had written its own text. Vestiges survive in the remedies set down
-the criminal action, the plea in equity, the private suit for damages. Otherwise
the bill, disclaiming all novelty, does no more than recite for the federal jurisdiction
the rules of the common law against restraint and monopoly.7 To many senators it
was a matter of regret that the proposed draft was not addressed more particularly
to "trusts," to "giant octopi," to "huge aggregates of capitalistic power" which were
becoming a menace to "the comfort of ordinary life" and to "republican institutions."
But the Judiciary Committee wanted to go warily "in entering upon a new and
untrodden field of legislation." In undertaking to curb by national authority an evil
which hitherto had been left to the states, it was loath to alter the established trends of
legal tolerance. Senator Edmunds, for the Committee, explained that the intent was
to make the "definition out of terms that were known to the law already." Senator
Hoar-who drafted the measure that bears the name of his colleague from Ohio 8-
stated that "we have affirmed the old doctrine of the common law in regard to all
interstate and international transactions. ' 9 Later, in debate, he remarked, "the great
thing that this bill does, except affording a remedy, is to extend to the federal juris-
diction the common law principles which protected fair competition in trade in old
times in England.' 10
Thus the bill repeated, rather than created, the law. Its principle hailed from the
days of petty trade, its intent was to impose upon business the rule of competition.
Its focus is a term of art, "restraint of trade," which has a clear legal significance.
Its lines of legality, its range of offenses, its prohibitions upon conduct are all those
of the common law. Its formal declaration was deemed necessary only because Con-
gress believed that there was no common law of the United States. A statute was
necessary to establish for the federal jurisdiction sanctions which the several states
enjoyed without formal enactmfent. The bill had vicissitudes which left not even a
dent on its structure; and in the form in which it was re-reported-or more strictly,
initially report'dd-it passed both houses, received the President's signature, and as
"the Sherman Act" became the law of the land.
II
A word about its development will throw into relief the character and sweep of
this rule against restraints. Although it dates from "time immemorial" it came into
the law in the period marked by the break-fip of the gilds." It is, like the enveloping
policy of the freedom of trade, an aspect of the national protest against the exclusive
7 Ibid.
B Senator George E. Hoar has said the act was called the Sherman Act for no other reason than that
Senator Sherman "had nothing to do with framing it whatsoever." 2 HOAR, AUTOBIORAPHY OF SFVENT'r
YEARs (903) 363. It is worthy of note that to John Sherman, Senator from Ohio, the Sherman Act was
the Silver Purchase Act.
921 Coxr. REc. 3146 (i89o). 102 CoNo. REc. 3152 (189o).
"Note the authority of cases in Coke's Reports in the development of the doctrine. Its close affinity
to the cause in which the learned jurist was enlisted is not to be overlooked. Note the common law cases
cited below.
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privileges enjoyed by these brotherhoods. In the law it was gradually elaborated out
of judgments which emerged from actions brought under the ancient writs. At first
the courts went no further than to refuse to entertain suits from persons who sought
their help in creating or maintaining restraints. Thus a writ of trespass was refused
to two schoolmasters who complained that a third had set up shop in competition
with them;' 2 and an action for trespass on the case was brought by the Prior of
Dunstable against a butcher, who instead of patronizing the Prior's market and
paying the stall fee, sold meats on a market day in his house.' 3 In like manner a writ
of debt sought by one John Dyer against a potential competitor who had obligated
himself not to use "his art of a dyer's craft" within the town for half a year touched
off the question of a restrictive covenant which ran against public policy.' 4 The
writ of assumpsit was also held not to be available to one party who sought to hold
another party to an agreement adjudged to be in restraint of trade.' 5 In time the
courts refused to grant aid to the person seeking to enforce, and afforded a remedy to
the person damaged by, a restrictive covenant. Thus out of such ancient writs,
through acceptance or denial of causes of action, the doctrine of restraint emerged.
The right to work became a fundamental tenet of the common law which a little
later was declared to be above the King himself.-0
The rule against restraints was not a creation of business enterprise. It took shape
in a society dominated by petty trade. It came from days in which a pecuniary
economy was in its early stages, the corporation little used, the techniques of acquisi-
tion still elementary, profits not yet an avowed end of adventure. The workaday
world was still of the arts; the enterpriser, still a craftsman, was intent upon making
a fair living for himself. 17 Initially the rule had only a secondary concern with
good, commodity, ware of trade. In a society ruled by handicraft, it is the skill of
men of various trades which is of dominant concern at law and in public policy.
The smith, the schoolmaster, the carrier, the barber-surgeon, plied their callings;
the baker, the tailor, the dyer, the furrier received materials from their customers
and to their "order" fashioned articles. The fabrication of wares for general sale in
an impersonal market belonged to the future. The rule against restraints was an
assertion that skills, occupations, mysteries, callings were affected with a public
interest.'
Little by little such initial steps were broadened into "the liberty of the subject
to pursue lawful and established trades." At the common law "no man could be
prohibited from working at any lawful trade, for the law abhors idleness, the mother
" The Schoolmaster's Case, Y. B. Hen. IV, f. 47, pl. 21 (1410).
"' The Meat Market Case, Y. B. Hen. VI, f. 19, p1. 13; f. 25, p1. 2 (1433).
"'Dyer's Case, Y. B. 2 Hen. V. f. 5, pl. 26 (1415).
Ir Note, among others, an Anonymous Case, Moore 115, 72 Eng. Rep. 477 (1578), wherein a covenant
by an apprentice not to engage in the craft of mercer in Nottingham for a period of four years was held
invalid, and the Blacksmith's Case, 3 Leon. 217, 74 Eng. Rep. 643 (1587), where a bond given by one
member of the fraternity to another not to ply his craft was held illegal.
'Statute of Monopolies, 21 JAC. I, ch. 3 (1623-24).
1 Assm.a, EcoNoimc ORGANIZATION OF ENGLAND (1928) 36.
"
8 Darcy v. Allen, ii Coke 84b, 77 Eng. Rep. i26o (K. B. 1602).
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of all evil"; nor does the common law compel "the artificers and people of mystery"
to "hold themselves everyone to one mystery" and "to no other than that which he
has chosen."' 9 In fact the enjoyment of "a whole trade" by an individual is "malum
in se," so contrary to the common law that it cannot be justified even by a royal
patent of monopoly.20 A landmark in the creation of the-rule involves the physician's
calling. A patent granted by the King to the Royal College of Physicians in London
had been confirmed by parliamentary act. Dr. Bonham, who had received a medical
degree from the University of Cambridge, was refused admission to practice. Lord
Coke found little difficulty in holding that the college had no legal authority to fine
or imprison the learned doctor. His moqt significant reason was that Dr. Bonham
was a competent physician, and the chaiter ;f the college, as confirmed by grant
and statute, did not extend to the denial to a competent practitioner of his common
right to the pursuit of his calling.21 This ruling that the common law fixes the
bounds of royal prerogative has become a milestone along the road that led to the
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Statute of Monopolies served to underline and to restate the rule against re-
straints.22 It professed to do no more than declare "the ancient and fundamental
law" of the realm. It recited the ban of old against "the sole buying, selling, mak-
ing, working or using of anything"; gave to any person or persons who might be
"hindered, grieved, disturbed or disquieted" on pretext of a royal grant, a right of
action for threefold the amount of the damages and double the costs; 23 and provided
that all such suits should be "forever hereafter examined, heard, tried and determined
by and according to the common laws of this* realm and not otherwise." In short,
the Act gave a legislative statement to the rule against restraints, elevated the common
law above the royal prerogative, and took from. the defense the right to plead a grant
of monopoly in a suit at law.2 4
As in England petty trade gave way to commerce, the common right went along.
Privilege had been the life blood of the gild merchant. Its dominant reason for being
was to preserve trade to its members; its charter gave it power to exclude those who
were not of the franchise.25 The craft gild, its successor, likewise by virtue of a charter
from Crown or municipality, had and held the exclusive practice of an art, but the
' Case of the Tailors of Ipswich, Ix Coke 53a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K. B. 1614).
"°Darcy v. Allen, xx Coke 84 b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K. B. x6o2).
" Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review (1926) 40 HAuv. L. REv. 30; Corwin, The "Higher
Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (1929) 42 HAv. L. REv. 365; Thorne, Dr. Bonham's
Case (938) 54 L. Q. Rev. 543.
22 The Statute .of Monopolies, 2z JAc. I, ch. 3 (1623-24).
"' Note the survival of the action in tort for "triple damages" in the Sherman Act. Note, too, that
although "double" the loss might be recovered in private suit, it was not until Senator Hoar rewrote the
bill in the idioms of the common law that the provision for triple damages appeared.
" The Statute of Monopolies was an act both against and for vested privileges. It had the support of
those who wished to curb the grant of royal favors. It had also support from persons who wished to
arrest further grants of letters patent lest they encroach upon their own privileges. In the act the decla-
ration of the general rule against restraints is supplied with a formidable list of exceptions. These saving
clauses extend to public bodies, to gilds of arts, trades and mysteries, and even to private individuals.
" CHENEY, IsrroDucriox TO THE INDUsTRIAL AND SociAL HIsTORY OF ENGLAND (rev. ed. 1920) $1,
I GRoSS, THE GILD MERCHANT (1890) 43-50.
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fraternities were open to all who could meet their professional standards. Member-
ship was granted to all who climbed the ladder of apprentice, journeyman and
master.26 As the man from the next town ceased to be a foreigner, as Flemish
weavers and continental chymists came over, as national control came to replace local
regulation, the restrictions in apprenticeship and against artisans from out of town
fell away, and the law made its response. By the middle of the sixteenth century a
statute of the realm provided that "no person shall interrupt or deny any freeman
carpenter, plasterer, joyner, hardhewer, sawyer, tiler, glasser, lime-burner; brick
maker, plumber or laborer born in this realm or made denison to work in any of
the said crafts in any city, borough or town corporate where he shall work nor be
free of the same, any statute, law, ordinance or other thing to the contrary notwith-
standing."27
Soon the courts were finding surviving privilege contrary to the ancient principles
of the common law. In the classic case of the Comitas Sicissororum et Operorrum.
Panorum,2 8 letters patent from the King were not enough, and it was held that a
qualified tailor, who had not received the gild's blessing, could not be kept from his
occupation. Young men "ought in their youth.., to learn lawful sciences and trades.
... The common law abhors all monopolies, which prohibit any from working in
any lawful trade." Apprenticeship is to be severely limited to its term of seven years.
The holding of the defendant from the free practice of his trade for a longer period
is "against the law ... against the liberty and freedom of the subject.., against the
common law, and the commonwealth. '29
In a nation of shop-keepers the pursuit of a calling became a property protected
against interference. "He that hinders another in his trade or livelihood is liable to
an action for so hindering him.'30 In time it became an inalienable right of an
Englishman and eventually even a natural right of man. 1 Today it is a common-
place for the courts of England to assert, against proscription by the Crown or col-
lusion of individuals, "the common right offreedom of trade."32
III
The doctrine of "the common right" to the unmolested pursuit of a calling found
an easy foothold in America. It was explicit in the corpus taken over from England
and continental conditions tended to confirm and to strengthen it. It was an expres-
26 x AsHmEy, ENGLISH EcooMic Hisfroay AND THEORY (i9o6) ch. II.
272 & 3 EDW. VI, c. 15, §4 (1548).
"' Commonly known as the Tailors of Ipswich, supra note 1g.
*20 It is added, "Ordinances for the good order and government of men of -trade and mysteries are
good, but not to restrain any one in his lawful mystery." Id. at 54a.
0 Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East. 574n, 575n (7o6).
° In France the skills of individuals were lifted above gild control and freedom in their exercise was
set within the order of nature itself. This ideology found expression in legislation. King Louis XVI's Edict
of 1776 denied that "the right to work is a royal privilege which the King might sell and his subjects
were bound to purchase from him." Indeed, "God in giving man want and desires rendering labor neces-
sary for their satisfaction, conferred the right to labor upon all men, and this property is the first, most
sacred of all."
"Attorney General of Australia v. Adelaide Steamship Co. [1913] A. C. 781, 794.
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sion of individual liberty, an aspect of the system of free enterprise, the very epitome
of "the American way of thought." The Declaration of Independence declared "life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" to be the property of everyman. "When the
Colonies separated from the mother country no privilege was more fully recognized
or more completely incorporated into the fundamental law" than the right of the
individual to "follow any of the known established trades and occupations of the
country."33 In the various states of the Union callings were open to all who were
willing to take their chances. The Great Republic was the land of opportunity.
The Fourteenth Amendment brought the common right into federal law. Here,
as in England, it was first asserted against a formal grant of monopoly. A reconstruc-
tion legislature of Louisiana dominated by carpet-baggers had conferred upon a
chartered company a monopoly in the slaughtering of cattle. The butchers, robbed
of their occupation, appealed to the courts. In their behalf it was argued that the act
of the state, by the denial of their right to their calling, had abridged their "privileges
and immunities" as "citizens of the United States."34 The Court was unwilling as
yet to go so far and by the closest of margins rejected the contention. But an issue
had been raised which would not down and presently had to be decided all over.
The butchers, whose plea had been rejected by the Court, appealed to the legislature
and secured the repeal of the obnoxious charter. With fortunes of war and arguments
reversed, it was this time the chartered company which appealed to the judiciary.85
Again "the opinion of the court" stood by the legislature. But two justices, who had
dissented before, now concurred in the result. They argued, not that the second act
of the legislature was valid, but that the first all along had been invalid 3  It would,
however, not do to revive the rhetoric of privileges and immunities; so the common
right of every man to his tide was tucked neatly away within the clause which
forbids a state to deny or abridge life, liberty, or property, "without due process of
law."
But two jurists, however bull-headed, are not a majority of a bench of nine. It
took time, a shifting opinion and the proper cases to allow the doctrine to grow up.
A classical economics which in the likeness of Newtonian physics made of industry
an automatic self-operating mechanism was dominant. The common-sense of a
pioneer nation united with the urges of a rising business community to impress upon
public policy the philosophy of laissez faire. A transition from "status" to "contract"
was in reputable belief the symbol of the march of mind and of culture. Because
men were coming to think that way the views of two stubborn jurists were quoted
by lesser judges as if they had been the opinion of the court. In due time the Court
rebuked state officials who would deny to a heathen Chinee the privilege of carrying
" Field, J., dissenting, in Slaughter House Cases, x6 Wall. 36, zo5 (1873).
" The Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 3.6 (1873). For the detailed development of this argument
and the resulting doctrine, see Hamilton, The Path of Due Process, in READ, Tm CoNSrrrtrnmoN RacoN-
smran (1938).
' Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., III U. S. 746 (1884).
"Field, J., concurring, id. at 754; Bradley J., concurring, id. at 76o.
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on the laundry trade. The "common right" at last had come into its own in the
name of "the equal protection of the laws."'3 7 Eventually the views of the two con-
trary and concurring brothers were accepted by the Court as canonical 3 8 As Mr.
Justice Peckham quoted Mr. Justice Bradley, "the right to follow any of the common
occupations of life is an inalienable right. It was formulated as such under the
phrase 'pursuit of happiness' in the Declaration of Independence." With the same
concurring opinion as authority, he identifies "the liberty of pursuit" with "the right
to follow any of the ordinary callings" and makes it "a large ingredient in the civil
liberty of the citizen. '3 9 In a gloss of his own Mr. Justice Peckham explains, "It is
true that these remarks were made in regard to questions of monopoly, but they well
describe the rights-to which are covered by the Wiord, 'liberty' as contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment"' 40 The common right to a calling-harking back to
ancient law and the Statute of Monopolies-becomes the sesame which opens the
due process clause to judicial interpretation.
The invocation of the "common right" pointed the path for due process. It
brought direction to groping justices, supplied a needed philosophy, and enabled the
bench to breath life into a vague and inviting clause. In days of old the Crown was
the principal source of monopoly; the legislature had now come into supremacy.
Against the law-making body could be hurled a sanction which had been designed
to keep the Stuart kings in their place. This sanction was the common law which
Lord Coke, Parliament, and Acts of Settlement had elevated above the royal
prerogative. In a country which grounded its legal system upon a written document,
the ends it has been invoked to serve could be read into the Constitution itself. Yet
the common right was no simple thing developing in isolation; it was an aspect of
a system of usages, a symbol of an organized economy. For if the law accorded to
one, it accorded to all, the right ot follow the trade of his choice. Crafts demand
their land, their shops, their tools, and as they adopt the ways of business, the
apparatus of production becomes elaborate. The freedom in respect to personal
service has its corollary in a liberty in respect to property. Under a scheme of "indi-
vidual initiative" freedom of contract fills the great office of drawing workmen and
materials into production, keeping industries going, adjusting the supplies of various
wares to the wants of men. Group is balanced against group, master against servant,
lender against borrower, buyer against seller. The urge of the individual towards
extravagant profits, excessive wages, stupendous bargains is held in check by others
of his kind seeking the same advantage. In a word free competition is invoked to
keep business going, absorb the shock of novelty, do justice between the parties. It
was not privilege which Peckham, Brewer, Harlan, JJ., sought to enthrone. It was
not property upon which they sought to confer the legal privilege of shaping the
terms of the bargain. They professed, with little qualification, an economic creed;
'
7 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (r886). " Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897).
" Id. at 589-590, quoting Bradley, J., concurring in Butchers' Union v. Crescent City Co., iii U. S.
746, 762. "o1d. at 590.
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and the empty receptacle of "due process" and the age-old vitality of "the common
right" enabled them to read "free competition" into the Constitution. 41
The sweep of doctrine appears in epitome in the famous bake-shop case. A statute
of New York limited the hours of workers in bake-shops to ten in any one day. This
act the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Peckham, found to be a deprivation of
liberty and property without due process of law.42 The rhetoric of the opinion is
almost that of the law; the underlying logic, which directs the argument straight to
its goal, is wholly that of economic faith. To the spokesman for the bench the state
legislature is a irresponsible monarch; the statute-in-question, a grant of immunity;
the bakers, the beneficiary of privilege. Upon all these the Court, armed with a
statute of monopolies tucked away within the Fourteenth Amendment, righteously
descends. The gist of the reasoning is that there is in the record not one scintilla of
evidence to indicate that bakers are not like other men-adult males quite able to
take care of their own interests in the bargaining process. To Mr. Justice Peckham,
and the four brethren who were in agreement, the dominant point was the lack of
a demonstration that in respect to the safeguarding of health the mechanism of free
contract was not adequate. A youth of sixty-two had just come to the Court as
Mr. Justice Holmes; and he, in probably the most famous dissent ever scribbled,
supplied the text against which the opinion must be read. The "Constitution is not
intended to embody a particular economic theory. '43 The majority of his brethren
were unwilling to allow a state to usurp an industrial office which belonged to free-
dom of contract.
Some three years later the matter was even more sharply put. The depression of
the nineties had witnessed a disastrous railroad strike. A Congressional intent that
the incident should not be repeated found expression in a statute providing for an
arbitration of differences upon interstate lines between masters and servants.44 A
section designed to instrument the act forbade any carrier to discharge a workman
because of his membership in a labor union. In a test case this provision was struck
down by the Court in the name of "due process of law." "The freedom of contract"
which Mr. Justice Peckham had found in the Fourteenth, was now discovered by
Mr. Justice Harlan to lie within the Fifth Amendment. 45 The spokesman for the
Court was an enemy of privilege, an ardent tru stbuster, a champion of the underdog.
He had dissented in the bake-shop case, believing that bakers were in an unfavorable
bargaining position, and citing statistics to clinch his point." In his mind the legal
norm of the common right to a calling was reinforced by the prevalent opinion of
the rural Kentucky in which he had grown up. So, for himself and his court, Mr.
'To capture the climate of opinion of the Court in the nineties read: Chicago, Milwaukee and St.
Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418 (i89o); U. S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895); U. S. v.
Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, x66 U. S. 290 (1897); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898); Allgeycr v.
Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (897). ' Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
""Holmes, J., dissenting, id. at 75. Note also evidence in the dissenting opinion of Harlan, J., that
the issue had been decided on an economic theory.
"The Erdman Act, 30 SAr. 424 (z898). '5 Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 6x (z9o8).
"Harlan, J., dissenting, in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 65 (19o5).
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Justice Harlan expressed deep-seated convictions in a language which belonged alike
to the ancient law, to the Constitution, to common sense, to sound economics. He
declared that "the right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems
proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe
the conditions upon which he will accept such labor." In the key of mutuality he
continues, "so the right of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for what-
ever reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense
with the services of such employee." And then crescendo he moves to his climax in
universal statement, "In all such particulars the employer and the employee have
equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary inter-
ference with the liberty of contract which no government can legally justify in a
free land. '47 With the common law as sanction and an American individualist to
wield the pen, the dogma of classical economics became the voice of the Constitution.
The common right, of course, could not control its own creation. Rules of law
have the habit of asserting authority far beyond the sway of the reasons that call
them into being. The ancient law that came into the "liberty" quickly passed on into
the "property" of the due process clause. The Court which in the bake-shop case
assumed the capacity of freedom of contract to do justice between the parties to
industry presently neglected to look at the operation of competition. Then, as cita-
tions became available, the Court was content to invoke authority and ceased to
need the support of economic theory.48
Even within a few years a weakness in bargaining position ceases to be relevant
"or comes to be regarded as an attribute of property. The shift in reference from the
system of free competition to the authority of "this Court" is clearly apparent in the
Reports. Mr. Justice Holmes answers Harlan, not in the instant case, but when after
the lapse of years the issue returns, "a workman not unnaturally may believe that
only by belonging to a union can he secure a contract that shall be fair to him....
If that belief, whether right or wrong, may be held by a reasonable man, it seems
to me that it may be enforced by law in order to establish the equality of position
between the parties in which liberty of contract begins."49 To this Mr. Justice Pitney
made instant retort, "No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there
must and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties
negotiating about a contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances.... And,
since it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in common, some persons must
have more property than others, it is from the nature of things impossible to uphold
freedom of contract and the right of private property without at the same time
recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of
"T Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S. 161, 174-5 (19o8). Note that Roscoe Pound takes these sentences as his
text in his classic article, Libeity of Contract (i9o9) 18 YALE L. J. 454.
"Compare with the earlier Lochner v. Newt York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905), or Adair v. U. S., 2o8 U. S.
161 (19o8), the logic of Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229 (1917), and Duplex
Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921).
"Dissenting in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 26-27 (1915).
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the exercise of those rights." 0 After such a leap, citation would suffice for all needful
reason.
The doctrine had drifted far from the reasons that had called it into being. It was
no longer argued that the affairs of industry had best be left to freedom of contract
between interested parties operating under a system of competition. Instead the dis-
position was to place the ordinary arrangements of business in a domain marked out
by due process as beyond legislative control. The arrangements of the market place
had now been committed into the rights of property. A doctrine derived from the
law against monopoly became a check upon the police power of the state. A sanction
invoked to outlaw privilege remained to enthrone it.
IV
So radical a position was not to be held. It was from the first compromised in the
failure of the whole court to go along. The call to retreat was sounded long before
the philosophy set down in dicta had been realized in holdings. In the very state-
ment of a freedom of contract-now grounded in the equities of property rather
than derived from the forces of competition-there were three sources of weakness
rather too close to the surface of the dialectic to be kept hidden. The first was the
instrumental character of the material out of which the theory of legislative im-
potence had been fashioned. Its underlying assumption was, not that business was
not affected with a public interest,51 but that competition provided a system of regu-
lation more effective than the government could devise. When agency was forgotten
and competition degenerated into laissez faire, the edifice began to crumble. The
second was that in invoking a usage of the ancient law, another usage of the ancient
law was overlooked. As old as the right of the individual to his calling was the right
of the state to regulate. It found expression in ordinance, assize, statute, in the
judicial hotion that price should be reasonable. In the concern of the government for
health, safety, morals, a police power had been too deeply embedded in the law to
be forgotten. The third was the curious paradox which attended the development of
the due process. So long as the appeal was from the legislature to freedom of con-
tract as an agency of social justice, the doctrine was functional. As soon as competi-
tion was forgotten, and freedom from legislative oversight became an attribute of
property, the function was lost. The anti-monopoly germ came into due process as
a doom upon immunity; in the refined doctrine it became a bulwark thrown about
immunity. As circumstance changed, as a knowledge of the character of industrial-
ism grew, as public opinion became sensitive to the evils of capitalism, the weaknesses
in the structure of due process were laid bare.
5o For the Court, id. at 17.
"' One of the most curious of phenomena which attended the reading of laissez faire into, constitutional
law was the doctrine of public interest. An attempt, in respect to the power of the legislature over prices,
to create a closed category of industries affected with a public interest was without economic foundation,
rested upon historical error, and defied the rigidities of logic. For the high spots, compare Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1877); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350 (19a8); and Nebbia v. New York, 291
U. S. 507 (x934).
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An awareness of the character of industrialism found expression in an expanding
oversight of industry. The needs of the people suggested, a growing public opinion
demanded, the legislature accorded measures of amelioration. In respect to every
statute, the persons to whom the act was distasteful fell back upon the judiciary as
the ultimate line of defence. The courts with stern conviction rejected new-fangled
laws; conducted arguments through intricate constitutional mazes, often of their own
invention; joyfully placed their imprimatur upon novelties. But whatever the fate
of an enactment the Constitutional ordeal had to be met. In a campaign that ran
through many battles, the older sanction of the police power was set against a novel
immunity in due process. In the struggle fortune was changeable; each doctrine had
its crescendo and its diminuendo; a rapid surge might be followed by a violent reac-
tion. But even judges of sternest convictions could not stand forever against the
instant beat of an industrialism, too turbulent to give order, too violent to do justice
between parties, headed it knew not whither. Legislation as an instrument of control
might be checked; it could not be outlawed.
As act took its place beside act, the simple lines of the competitive design dom-
inated the complicated pattern which emerged. There was no idea of abridging the
common right to a calling, of denying freedom of contract, of deflecting "private
enterprise" from its orbit. The thought was rather to adjust the system of competi-
tion to the shortcomings which experience had revealed. The norms of "fair" and
"unfair" were evoked, and in the Clayton Act8 2 the Congress wrote, and in the
Robinson-Patman Act5 3 revised, rules of the game for the competitive struggle. In-
dustry is a concatenation of processes which must click together. If all its arrange-
ments are at the mercy of a miscellany of individual agreements, the gears can never
be made to engage. A concert can be secured only through some body of common
understandings. In instances business may continue to do the trick itself, as it has
with the standardization of parts, the continuance of market mechanisms, the inven-
tion of vocabularies for various trades. But, if it does not, the state must be called
upon to make the cogs turn neatly together. Matters are often too deeply affected
with a public interest for all the terms of the contract to be left to the private parties
immediately concerned.
The body politic steps in to prescribe weights and measures, regulate hours of
labor,5 4 impose employer's liability,55 prevent payments in script, 56 prescribe min-
imum rates of wages.5 7 In conserving human resources it prohibits night work for
women5 s and outlaws child labor.59 In all such cases freedo i of contract is set
0238 STAT. 730 (1914); 15 U. S. C. §§12-27 (1927).
1149 STAT. 1526 (1936); 15 U. S. C. §13, 13a.
' Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (917).
" Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400 (1919).
' McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539 (9o9).
' West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (937).
s Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292 (1924).
19 There has never been any question of the right of the state to prohibit child labor. Doubts about
the power of the federal government are now probably without foundation. If Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U. S. 251 (1918), has not been overruled, it seems clearly to have been outmoded.
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within a matrix of arrangements prescribed by authority. The lack of bargaining
power on the part of weaker groups has been recognized. The protection of govern-
ment has been accorded to trade unions 0 and to farmers' cooperatives towards dis-
posing of their services and products through an orderly process of collective bar-
gaining. The aid of the government has been accorded to the milk0" and the
bituminous coal62 industries to help competition over the hard places. A loss of
foreign markets has played hob with the orderly growing of staple crops and the
market has been unable to adjust 'production to a falling demand. Congress has
come to the rescue with an agricultural adjustment act designed to effect stability
in a period of rapid transition." It is only in respect to public utilities that the lines
of control seriously depart from the competitive norm. Even there the competitive
ideal is retained, and a commission is set up to safeguard the interests which free
enterprise can no'-longer serve. The topography of public control may be intricate;
the detail of many designs may lie on its face. Yet in stark outline it still exhibits
the bold lines of the competitive pattern.
V
Accordingly a simple rationale relates the Sherman Act to other statutes and
draws various measures for the regulation of industry into an articulate whole. The
hub from which the pattern of control radiates is the general rule against restraints.
Its ban rests upon all persons; its prohibition lies against every act of the type at
which it is aimed. It has no distinctive domain, no area of the national economy is
exempt from its operation; the members of no class, caste, group are saved from its
command.6 4 Like trespass, assault, deceit, wanton negligence, it is an offense of
which any person may be guilty. The rule against restraints, like all wrongs recog-
nized at common law, is universal in-its sweep.
An exclusion from the rule against restraints is the kind of thing known to the
common law as an immunity. Since time immemorial the authority of the King,
Crown, State has been regarded as general. A privilege, perquisite, immunity, ex-
ception has always taken the form of a writing in which the "liberty" or "liberties"
granted have in explicit terms been specified and defined. 65 Even "ancient liberties"
-dating far back, thoroughly established, quite unchallenged-were eventually com-
"National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U. S. I (1937).
"x Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502 (1934).
02 Bituminous Coal Act of 1937, 50 STAT. 72 (i937), 15 U. S. C. c. 17B.
e' See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U. S. 38, 42 (939).
""The Sherman Act is a broad enactment prohibiting unreasonable restraints upon interstate com-
merce, and monopolization, or attempts to monopolize, with penal sanctions." Hughes, C. J., in U. S. v.
The Borden Co., 6o Sup. Ct. X82, x88 (1939).
"Note, for example, the liberty of the Prior of Dunstall, Y. B., ii Hen. VI, f. 19, p. 13; the crown
grant of a market "with all liberties and free customs" pertaining thereto to "the abbey and convent of
Ramsey," 2 CAXRruLAruMs, MoxAsTAaiI DE RAMESE A (R.S.) (x886) 298; the liberties of the merchant
gild of Berwick-upon-Tweed, TOULMIN SMiTH, ENOLIsH GUILDs (1870) 338-346; the privilege and
liberties of the College of Physicians of the City of London, GOODALL, HISToRy or, THE COLLEGE OF
PmysicsNs or LosoN. See Thorne, The Constitution and the Courts:. a Reexamination of the Famous
Case of Dr. Bonham, in READ, THE CONSTITUTION REcoNsipE.vE (1938).
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mitted to parchment. Thus lords of the realm, ecclesiastical establishments, munic-
ipalities, fraternities, mysteries, colleges of physicians, honorable companies had each
its distinctive prerogatives. As responsible government developed, the legislature
replaced the Crown. Privilege, to be valid against or an exception to, the general
law, had to be confirmed by Act of Parliament.
A concern to safeguard the rule against restraints was at the very heart of the
movement towards statutory sanction. Here the creative period for Anglo-American
law is the seventeenth century. From the accession of James I to the abdication of
James II, royal provocation and legislative response, political act and military event,
beat upon the Constitution to level ancient rights into a general law before which
all men are equal. In this era the liberties of towns, fraternities, mysteries, individuals
were transformed. The miscellany of specific perquisites within the commonwealth
which the plural "liberties" connoted was converted into the abstract singular
"liberty." This verbal receptacle-never sharply defined, never reduced to a list of
particulars-came to provide a domicile for such liberties as belonged to all subjects
and were consonant with the legal principle of equality before the law. Such liberties,
now aspects of a large and more dominant "liberty," were grounded upon sanctions
far more enduring than letters patent, a royal charter, or even a parliamentary statute.
Before the century was done the particulars which make up liberty had become the
inalienable rights of Englishmen. A century later they were definitely established
in an order of nature as the rights of men. Meanwhile liberties-ancient or usurped
-which could not be translated into universal rights had a strong presumption set
over against them. Many were too deeply entrenched within the social fabric to
yield at once to the demands of constitutional government.66 But such liberties came
presently to be recognized as immunities. The royal pleasure, however explicit its
manifestation, was no longer a lawful warrant', It was everywhere exposed to the
general law. The will of the legislature was necessary to its security.
When the Sherman Act was being debated, it was understood that its prohibitions
were personal and general; that exception and limitation are created only by legis-
lative act. As the statute took shape, questions of the immunity of laborers and of
farmers in respect to certain forms of collective activity were repeatedly raised. 7 At
one time an immunity was written into the bill in favor of a process of collective
bargaining whose objectives were to lower hours and to raise wages. A similar
amendment excepted farmers' cooperatives in activities concerned with "the primary
scale of their products."'68 As the current Act was shaped by the Judiciary Com-
mittee, they went down with the bill into which they had been incorporated.
" Note, for instance, the liberties preserved to towns, companies, and even individuals by the Statute
of Monopolies.
" See e.g. 21 CONG. REc. 2560-2562, 2565, 2571, 2606, 2654-2655, 2727, 2728 (i89o).
" "That this act shall not be construed to apply to any arrangements, agreements, or combinations
between the laborers, made with a view of lessening the number of hours of labor or the increasing of
their wages: nor to any arrangements, agreements, or combinations among persons engaged in horticulture
or agriculture made with a view of enhancing the prices of their own agricultural or horticultural prod-
ucts." S. i, as amended, 51st Cong., ist Sess. (89o).
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As statute after statute has accommodated the competition pattern to the actualities
of industry, exception has been by explicit grant. In every enactment the department
from the rule against restraints has been severely limited. In object, activity, opera-
tion, the Act of Congress is held to its province; it is hedged about with precautions
which keep it from becoming a general immunity. Thus the Webb Export Trade
Act exempts from the charge of illegality under the Sherman Law "an association
entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade and actually engaged
solely in such export trade."69 The Wagner Act,70 with trim lines and clear-cut
intent, does not exempt trade unions from the prohibitions of the antitrust law.
Instead it provides an orderly rubric for collective agreement about hours, wages and
conditions of employment. Outside of the ordained procedure, which is subjected
to the oversight of a regulatory body, the activities of laborers, even when done under
trade union auspices, are subject to the general law. The statutes designed to insure
to farmers fair prices are of similar kind. They offer protection in the primary sale
of wheat, corn, cotton, hogs, dairy products. But they are drawn with a scrupulous
regard for the objectives of the Sherman Act. The Capper-Volstead Act 7' provides
that "if the Secretary of Agriculture shall have reason to believe that such association
monopolizes or restrains trade in interstate or foreign commerce to such an extent
that the price of any agricultural product is unduly enhanced," he shall through the
necessary steps of complaint, notice, hearing, and order cause it "to cease and desist
from monopolization or restraint of trade." In the Agricultural Marketing Agree-
ment Act,72 the immunities granted are detailed, and the rule against restraints con-
tinues to fix the limits of tolerance. 73 In the Fisheries Cooperative Marketing Act a
similar power to proceed, if activities cross the line of legal tolerance, is granted to
the Secretary of Commerce.74 In this sheaf of cooperative legislation, the power of
initiation is conferred upon an official other than the Attorney General, but the
ancient ban upon restraints is not relaxed.
In a number of instances where it is manifest that competition does not do the
job, Congress has resorted to another type of regulatory device. Even before the
Sherman Act was passed a commission was established for the regulation of the
railroads. As the logic of the new arrangement became obvious, the carriers were
relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws "in so far as may be necessary to
enable them to do anything authorized or required" by an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. 75 It is of note that it was not until after the regulatory
" There are the further provisions that "such association, agreement, or act is not in restraint of trade
within the United States" and "such association does not, either in the United States or elsewhere, enter
into any agreement, understanding, or conspiracy, or do any act which artificially or intentionally enhances
or depresses prices within the United States." 40 STAT. 516, 517 (918), 15 U. S. C. §62.
70 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. c. 7. 71 42 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U. S. C. §292.72 5o STAT. 246, 249 (1937), 7 U. S. C. §§6o8b, 671(d).
73 "The Agricultural Act is a limited statute with specific reference to particular transactions which
may be regulated by official action in a prescribed manner. . . . If Congress had desired to grant any
further ismunity, Congress doubtless would have said so." Hughes, C. J., in United States v. The Borden
Co., 6o Sup. Ct. 182, x88 (1939).
74 48 STAT. 1214 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §522. 7" 48 STAT. 215 (1933), 49 U. S. C. §5(15),
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system had been fully matured that the verbal defenses of the Sherman Act were
relaxed. 76 Under the Shipping Act certain agreements are excepted from the Sherman
Act; but it is unlawful to carry out such understandings without the approval of the
Shipping Board, 77 which has authority to accept, to reject, or to modify. Of like
effect, and for reasons peculiar to the business, is the saving clause written into the
Marine Insurance Association Act.78 In all such cases the public interest is as clearly
and fully recognized as under the antitrust laws. But motor carriers, railroads, ship-
ping, and things relating thereto, have ways of their own and places quite unique
in the natural economy. So a public authority is set up the better to impose the public
interest which a primitive competition seems powerless to promote.
A simple, definite, common-sense system of values shapes this series of measures
which impresses a public policy upon the national economy. Its dominant principles-
are equality before the law and the common rule against restraints. There is, in the
instance, much accommodation of requirements to the realities of the industrial order.
But in the whole structure of legislation, there is little of recognized privilege or of
immunity from the general law. The seeming exceptions, under examination, turn
out to be no more than departures to effect adjustments of the common rule to dis-
tinctive circumstances. These departures fall roughly into two distinct classes: (i)
the provision of some agency of public interest where circumstance renders competi-
tion an undependable instrument and (2) the indulgence of a limited collective
activity to groups whose individual members are in a bargaining position inferior to
that of the parties with whom they must deal. Laborers and farmers habitually
accept contracts whose terms they have little power to shape. Legislation concerned
with collective bargaining and cooperative marketing aims to help the worker and
the farmer up to the plane upon which competition is presumed to do its work. But
it is from such a plane that monop6ly, combination, conspiracy reaches up after that
which is illegal. The very statutes, which attempt to elevate weaker groups to the
cpmpetitive plane, seek by the most express commands to hold them there. Rarely
has a rule of the general law been so zealously guarded against exception and
immunity. VI
Thus was fashioned and fortified against immunities the legal ban on restraints.
It dates from the period in which the supremacy of the law was asserted over the
arbitrary will of the Crown. It is an instrument through which the royal pleasure
was curbed, privilege fell before the common rule; all men-irrespective of class,
caste, rank, wealth, profession, calling-were made equal before the law. The prin-
ciple of "equal protection of the laws" has become an axiom of Anglo-American
jurisprudence. It finds explicit statement in the Federal Constitution and the con-
stitutions of the several states. It is embedded in the great corpus of the law reports.
Its place in the structure of justice is far too obvious to invite elaboration or to
demand citation.
" Note also similar provisions in the Motor Carrier Act, 49 STAT. 543 (x935), 49 U. S. C. §3 13f.
7739 STAT. 733 (1916), 46 U. S. C. §814. 7841 STAT. 1000 (1929), 46 U. S. 0. §885.
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It is significant that a high place within the law was early accorded to the right
to a calling. A man could not, with a threat to his livelihood or to the common good,
barter it away.79 In protecting it against royal grant, monopoly or collusive conduct,
he was entidtld to his action. Once upon a time a gild, a university, a college of
physicians, an honorable company, had its own system of police, with the rights of
license, search and seizure, presentment and trial, fine and imprisonment, all the
perquisites of effective discipline. Now the larger office has been taken over by the
state, and in respect to trades, callings, occupations, fraternities, corporations, and
even religious bodies, a private police is legally taboo.80 Men may freely band them-
selves in association, but their by-laws must not encroach upon the law of the land.
The age of benefit of clergy is gone and an ancient privilege is not likely to be revived
to the advantage of a more secular calling.
In the Sherman Act, as at common law, the offense is specified, but is not reduced
to a catalogue of particulars. This is in accord with the spirit of an institution which
aims to contrive instruments flexible enough to meet the demands for justice under
shifting circumstances. Public policy must of necessity find expression in the most
general terms. The objectives of the federal government are set down in a handful
of prepositional phrases. The general objective of domestic legislation is "the com-
mon good" or "the general welfare." The police power, which keeps in order the
affairs of a nation, aims at nothing more specific than public morals, public safety,
public health. The provisions of the Sherman Act are written in the most general
language, broad enough to meet all sorts of conditions, flexible enough to compre-
hend situations as they arise.
In every case hot from the affairs of business, the appeal is to the reasonable man.
And with the reason of the common law-and its zone of discretion-the processes
of justice cannot dispense. As time passes callings become businesses, occupations
come and are gone, restraints alter in magnitude and character. To keep abreast of
the times an industry undergoes constant revision in technology, organization, cor-
porate structure, trade practices, marketing methods. To set down a prohibition as
a detail of "thou shalt nots" is to- stage an adventure into futility. Forbidden things
will soon be done in unforbidden ways and presently the prohibitions apply only to
"' An individual sells his trade, his business, his practice to another. The value of the assets which
pass depends upon the withdrawal of the seller. He agrees not to resume his occupation within a specified
area and over a certain span of years. A breach of contract provokes a suit which is met with a plea that
the restrictive covenant is void as against public policy. In the cases the right of the individual to do as
he will with his own is set over against the harm he threatens to the public interest. The more replaceable
the worker, the less skilled the occupation, the less of a necessity the commodity, the less strategic the
industry, the more heavily the balance tips toward individual advantage. The more unique the craftsman,
the more learned the mystery, the more necessary the service, the greater the compulsion. If an essential
service to the community is at stake, a man cannot, of his own will and to his own advantage, bargain
away his right to his trade. Leading cases are Mitchell v. Reynolds, i P. Wms. 18S, 24 Eng. Rep. 347
(17ii); Hitchcock v-, Coper, 6 Ad. & E. 438, 112 Eng. Rep. 167 (1837); Union Strawboard Co. v. Bon-
field, 193, Ill. 42o, 61 N. E. 1038 (19ox); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, xo6 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419
(1887); Von Bremen v. MacMonnies, 20' N. Y. 41, 93 N. E. 186 (191o); Oregon Steam Navigation Co.
v. Winsor, 2o Wall. 64 (U. S. 1873).
" This is not to say that such systems of private police do not exist. Any student of industries or any
attorney who has followed antitrust cases for a period of years can recite numerous examples.
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that which has ceased to be. As the national economy is transformed, such a pro-
cedure would quickly leave a wider and wider territory without the law. The gen-
eral words of the act, with reason to direct, arrest and appoint limits, prevent the
command from being frozen into obsolescence. The rule against restraints indicates
clearly the type of activity to which tolerance is not to be accorded. As with other
ordinances which announce policy, the application of the rule awaits the specific
occasion. As the concrete issue is met, the antitrust law comes to grips with current
reality.
The standard is definite enough to meet the requirements of justice. As with any
other general rule, when the norm of restraint of trade is laid against a course of
conduct, there are borderline cases. Here, because of the complicated character of
the practices under review and the balance of values involved in judgment, they are
often more than usually perplexing. But however difficult extreme cases may prove,
the principles that should resolve them have been clearly proclaimed. Nor are they
sheer abstractions for whose meaning public officials and courts must fumble. They
have emerged from the concretions of litigation, out of a medley of human tangles,
over a span of centuries. A contract which imposes a restraint upon trade may be
upheld or struck down. If upheld the reason is, as stated by a wise judge years ago,
"not because they are advantageous to the individual," but "because it is for the
benefit of the public at large that they be enforced." 8' Or, as another able jurist has
put it, the agreement is reasonable if "the restraint is such only as to afford a fair
protection to the interests of the party in favor'of whom it is given, and not so large as
to interfere with the interests of the public. 82 The state cannot allow private parties
to bargain or conspire away the advantage which the community has in access to
members of a calling or in a competition for its patronage.
The Sherman Act is thus in accord with the great American tradition. Callings
are by law open to all; men have a right to buy and sell in a free and open market.
Yet the competitive system is not the ultimate word in industrial order; nor is it a
definitive answer to all the problems of the national economy. Already an elaborate
structure of statutes testifies to its shortcomings in operati6n. It may be that in the
near future we must seriously depart from its pattern to serve the public interest.
But, eyen in modification and departure, the norm of social justice embodied in the
rule against restraints may not cease to be a guide. In any venture into regulation
every party has a right to insist that it be accorded an equivalent for the protection
of the open market which he is called upon to surrender. In a world where the
unknown crowds upon us, public policy cai have no enduring ultimate. For. its
guidance we may discover a more reasonable scheme of values than we now know.
But until that time, the objectives of the common right and the Sherman Act must
continue to direct. However the pattern of industrial government is modified, the
ideal they embody will remain the reference for economic justice.
8' Baron Parke, in Mallan v. May, ii Mees. & W.-, 653, 665, 152 Eng. Rep. 967, 972 (1843).
88 Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt & Co. [1894] A. C. 535, 567.
